IP Lists are the bluntest instrument EdgeGuard has, and the first one it uses. An address on a list is decided before any rule, any bot check and any score. That makes them cheap and absolute — which is exactly why they need care.

IP lists are consulted at the very start, before the firewall rules, before threat intelligence, before geo blocking and before any detection:
X-Security-Bypass: hierarchy-allowlist, and that decision is cached for five minutes.Two consequences follow, and both matter more than they look:
An allowlisted address is not inspected at all. Not by the rulesets, not by bot detection, not by rate limits, not by learned rules. If that machine is ever compromised, or its address is ever reused, you have an unguarded path into the application.
The allowlist beats the blocklist. An address on both is allowed. This is deliberate — an exception must be able to override a broad block — but it means a wide allowlist entry can silently undo a block you added later.

Click Add IP.
192.0.2.66) or a range (192.0.2.0/24). Ranges are matched properly, so a /24 covers its 256 addresses without listing them.Changes reach the agents within about 30 seconds.
Prefer an expiry. An address that attacked you today is very often a residential or cloud address that belongs to somebody else next month. A block with a duration says "for now"; a permanent block says "forever", and nobody ever revisits it.

Paste an address and the console searches every reputation and threat-intelligence source it has: a risk score, a verdict such as Suspicious, which feeds name it, and what it has done on your own installation.
Use it before adding a block — the answer is often "this is a known scanner in a hosting range", which argues for blocking the whole range rather than the one address, or for a rate limit rather than a block.
1. A blocked address. From that address, or with a test that presents it:
curl -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' "https://site.example.com/" # expect 403
The response carries an EdgeGuard ID; pasting it into the global search opens the exact event, whose reason reads hierarchy_ip_blocked.
2. An allowlisted address. The response header X-Security-Bypass: hierarchy-allowlist is the proof. Remember that the decision is cached for five minutes: a change you make now may take that long to be visible from the same address.
3. The list itself. The entry shows in the tab with its scope, reason and expiry.
| Situation | Better tool |
|---|---|
| The address is attacking one path only | a firewall rule with a path condition |
| It is a whole hosting provider | a firewall rule matching the ASN, which survives address changes |
| It is too much traffic rather than bad traffic | Rate Limits |
| It is a crawler claiming to be Google | Bot Management, which verifies by reverse DNS |
| You want an exception for one rule | a false-positive exclusion, not an allowlist entry |
That last row is the most common mistake. An allowlist entry to fix one noisy rule turns off every protection for that client, which is a very large payment for a small problem.
Two features write to these lists on their own: