Some senders cannot authenticate.
A copier that scans to email, a monitoring probe, an industrial controller, an application whose SMTP client predates SASL:
They are legitimate, they are yours, and they have no way to present a password.
This page lists the client addresses that are allowed to send mail without authenticating.
The page is SMTP authentication whitelist, reachable from the SMTP service menu. It governs one Postfix instance at a time.
It is a narrow permission, deliberately. A whitelisted address is excused from authenticating and that is all — it does not become trusted for anything else:
Before you add anything, the appliance behaves exactly as it did. There is no switch to turn on: the list itself is the switch.

Add an address opens the form. Enter a single address (192.168.10.25) or a range in CIDR notation (203.0.113.64/26), and a description.
The description is required on purpose: in six months, an entry nobody can explain is an entry nobody dares remove. Host names are refused — a name could change what is permitted without anyone editing anything.

Adding an address stores it; the mail server has not been told yet. The page says so, and the device still cannot send until you click Apply configuration. If a newly added device is still being refused, this banner is the first thing to check.

Apply configuration hands the list to Postfix and reloads it. Mail in flight is not interrupted, and the change takes effect immediately.

0.0.0.0/0 — or its IPv6 equivalent — would let anyone in the world relay mail through your server without a password. That is the textbook definition of an open relay, and it would be found and abused within hours. The page refuses it rather than warning about it: no legitimate device needs "the whole internet".

A large public range — anything wider than a /24 — is accepted, because an organisation that owns the range may legitimately want it, but it is marked on the list from then on. The warning does not disappear after you click past it: it stays visible so that a broad entry added months ago cannot quietly become permanent furniture.
Private ranges are never flagged: they are not reachable from the internet, and warning about them would train you to ignore the warning that matters.

Use the Enabled switch rather than deleting the entry, then apply. Deleting is for devices that are gone for good; disabling is for everything else, and it is reversible in one click.
Add the new address, apply, check that it sends, then disable the old entry. Doing it in that order means the service is never interrupted, and the old entry is still there if the replacement turns out to be misconfigured.
The appliance has a second, complementary list: Addresses allowed to authenticate, which confines SMTP authentication to addresses you name.
The two do not overlap. An address on this whitelist never authenticates, so that restriction has nothing to apply to it. In practice:
| Symptom | Most likely cause |
|---|---|
| The device is in the list but still cannot send | The change was saved and never applied. Look for the red Changes not applied yet banner and click Apply configuration. |
| Adding the address changed nothing — it was already working | The device is inside your trusted networks, which are allowed before this list is even consulted. Check postconf -h mynetworks. |
| The device sends to internal recipients but not to the outside | Relaying to external domains is exactly what this list grants, so confirm the entry is enabled and applied, and that the address you listed is the one Postfix sees A device behind a NAT or a proxy arrives with a different address. |
| Mail from the device is accepted then rejected or filed as spam | Not this list: it only excuses authentication. Blocklists, the antivirus and the antispam filters still apply, and are the place to look. |
| The address is refused when you try to add it | Host names are not accepted, and a range covering the whole internet is refused. The message names which rule applies. |